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International !Aw and Pollution, edited by Daniel Barstow Magraw, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1991, Pp. 368. 
It is now axiomatic that the law of the environment is among the most briskly 
expanding, innovative areas in the international legal system. While its rapidly changing 
character makes international environmental law an exciting area in which to work and 
practice, that same attribute poses a considerable challenge to editors of books like Interna-
tional Law and Pollution. This collection of sixteen essays by fourteen distinguished 
authors primarily from North America and Europe focuses on acid deposition on those 
two continents and pollution from nuclear accidents, with particular attention to the 
1986 Chernobyl disaster. By concentrating on two issues that are both current yet 
sufficiently mature to warrant an extended treatment from which larger inferences can 
be drawn, Daniel Barstow Magraw has struck a workable balance between the potentially 
conflicting demands of timeliness and depth. 
The extended period required to prepare such an ambitious undertaking for publication 
nonetheless has costs. Despite the book's 1991 copyright, most of the articles date from 
two 1988 symposia: the Tenth Sokol Colloquium on International Law held at the 
University of Virginia School of Law (USA) and the annual meeting of the American 
Bar Association held in Toronto, Canada that year. A number of authors have updated 
their presentations to reflect developments through late 1989. Even so, the book does 
not reflect major recent developments that have dramatically altered the law and policy 
governing acid rain, such as the enactment of a legislatively mandated emissions 
reduction program in the United States' or the new international agreement between 
the United States and Canada. 2 Although the more than ten percent of the book devoted 
to acid rain in North America is consequently out of date, those passages will retain legal 
and historical interest for scholars. The remainder of the pieces address subjects that, by 
contrast, have been characterized by a more gradual evolution and are, therefore, more 
current in their treatment. 
By and large, the contributing authors solidly and clearly articulate the current state 
of law and scholarship with the support of uniformly thorough documentation. Gunther 
Handl's case study of the Chernobyl accident, which draws on primary sources in no 
fewer than six languages, is particularly impressive in this regard. Those inclined to view 
European Community law as a swamp will particularly welcome Johan Lammers's lucid 
exposition of the law of acid rain in Europe. Apart from an unfortunate lapse through 
which the ill-fated Italian town of Seveso suffers the further indignity of repeated mis-
spelling, the book appears accurate and well-researched. 
On an analytical level, International !Aw and Pollution is fairly representative of current 
mainstream approaches to international environmental law. As such, it holds new 
insights for aficionado and novice alike, thereby augmenting scholarship in the field. 
Virtually all the authors attempt to analyze, integrate, and synthesize broad cross-cutting 
motifs. For example, in a chapter weaving themes of economic development and human 
rights with environment, Professor Magraw draws an interesting analogy between, on 
the one hand, the International Law Commission's highly controversial treatment of the 
1 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 401, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584-2631 
(1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-76510 (adding acid rain program to Clean Air Act as new§§ 
401-416). 
2 Agreement on Air Quality, United States-Canada, March 13, 1991, reproduced in IER 701 
(1991); 30 IIM 678 (1991). 
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questionably-entitled topic of international liability for injurious consequences arising 
out of acts not prohibited by international law and, on the other, the well-accepted law 
of state responsibility with respect to injuries to aliens. 
Several of the contributors urge a necessary expansion in the scope of the discipline of 
international environmental law. Ian Brownlie and Paul Szasz, for instance, identify the 
indisputable need for a more effective interface with other fields oflearning, and espec-
ially scientific disciplines, in making, enforcing, and adjudicating international 
environmental law. James Galloway responds with an article describing the underlying 
science of the acid deposition phenomenon. Professor Brownlie hints at the richness of 
inferences that could be drawn from a painstaking but revealing examination of actual 
state practice. Professor Handl responds by documenting the absence of state-to-state 
claims based on a theory of state responsibility after Chernobyl. Professor Magraw 
describes Canada's reluctance to resort to binding adjudication or arbitration to resolve 
its dispute with the United States over acid rain. 
For the most part, however, these essays do not - and do not purport to - address 
thoroughgoing criticisms of the basic fabric of international environmental law. By contrast, 
a recent extended essay in the Harvard Law Review3 presents a most forceful articulation of 
the inadequacies of international environmental law. Among the charges leveled at the 
existing international law of the environment are the alleged ineffectiveness of the cus-
tomary law of state responsibility as a tool for improving environmental quality,4 the 
supposed inconsequential role of state-to-state third party dispute resolution processes,5 
and the asserted vagueness to the point of unenforceability of many of the substantive 
requirements that do exist. 6 While those critics might themselves be accused of wielding 
meat cleavers instead of scalpels, their conclusions are fundamentally valid and demand 
a response. That the insights of the contributors to International Law and Pollution do not 
lead those authors to question the underlying structure of the law in this area is not so 
much a failing of the book itself as an indication of the broader state of the discipline of 
international environmental law. 
That the entire treatment of the law on the environment in the current Restatement7 is 
cast in the analytical framework of international liability suggests that principles of state 
responsibility are well accepted in practice. Yet, concrete examples involving payment 
of claims based on the customary law of state responsibility are virtually unknown in the 
environmental area. Moreover, such examples as there are might well be taken to suggest 
that states do not recognize the existence of such a regime based on customary principles. At 
least one environmental agreement - the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution8 adopted under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe and 
discussed by Professor Lammers in his chapter - explicitly repudiates any implications of 
state responsibility. Professor Handl's study of the Chernobyl accident in International 
Law and Pollution asserts that that case was an aberrant, perhaps unique, failure of customary 
principles of state responsibility. However, a discriminating reader might well ask 
3 "Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law," 104 Harvard LRev. 1484 
(1991). 
4 See, e.g., id. at 1492-1504 (criticizing "stillborn regime of international liability"). 
See, e.g., id. at 1561-63 (describing "failure of international adjudication"). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 1504-06. 
7 2 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Llw of the United States § § 601-604 (1987). 
8 November 13, 1979, art.8, para.f, n.1, TIAS No. 10,541, reprinted in A. Kiss, Selected Multilateral 
Treaties in the Field of the Environment 519 (1983); 6 EnvP&L 37 (1980); IER 3001 (1991); 18 
IIM 1442 (1979). 
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whether the Chernobyl experience is symptomatic of more pervasive structural 
weaknesses in the international law of the environment. 
One might be excused for serious doubts about the adequacy of a state responsibility 
regime by itself for the task of global environmental protection. For one thing, 
customary standards of state conduct are often not sufficiently developed to enable a 
determination of liability. As in the domestic law of toxic torts, causation may be hard to 
establish. The magnitude of harm may be difficult or impossible to determine, and 
money damages may not be adequate compensation. Significant questions may arise as 
to whether a state is under an international obligation adequately to regulate the conduct 
of private parties under its jurisdiction and whether the actions of its citizens are attributable 
to that state for purposes of engaging responsibility. Perhaps most importantly, the case-
by-case development of international environmental norms via a state responsibility 
approach is too slow, cumbersome, inexact, and insufficiently precautionary in nature to 
anticipate, prevent, and remedy the damage from the mammoth environmental risks 
facing the world today. 
Likewise, a great deal of scholarly attention has centered around the role of compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanisms in international environmental law. But notwithstanding 
the famous language in the hoary Trail Smelter9 arbitration, whose legal force is not 
entirely without question, 10 there have been astonishingly few contentious cases in inter-
national tribunals involving environmental disputes. To be sure, the International Court 
of Justice (lCJ) now has its fullest docket ever, and at least one case pending as of early 
1992 may have environmental overtones.11 On the other hand, the withdrawal by the 
United States of its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 198512 suggests 
that at least some states are less receptive to binding, third party processes than in the 
past. 
Potential "plaintiff' states may be reluctant to initiate dispute resolution procedures 
against other states for a multiplicity of political reasons that may have nothing to do 
with the actual controversy. For example, as noted without explanation by Professor 
Magraw in his chapter on acid rain, until the recent agreement on air quality between 
the United States and Canada13 there was nothing to prevent Canada from urging an inter-
national adjudication or arbitration of the acid rain controversy. An unstated, but likely 
rationale for Canada's reluctance to request a binding, third-party process is concern that 
such a request with respect to this highly-charged domestic issue in the United States could 
jeopardize other mutually beneficial bilateral relationships that have nothing to do with 
9 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 UNRIAA 1905, 1965 (1938 & 1941) ("under the principles of 
international law ... no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence"). 
10 See, e.g., Kirgis, "Technological Challenge to the Shared Environment: United States Practice," 66 
AJIL 290, 293 (1972) (noting that "Canada did not actively contest its responsibility for the 
conduct of the smelter"). 
11 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) (filed May 19, 1989) (seeking restitution 
or other appropriate reparation for alleged violation by Australia of trusteeship obligations 
and customary international law with respect to phosphate lands mined under Australian 
administration before Nauman independence). 
12 Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the United States, to Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985) (terminating United States 
declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction ofICJ), reprinted in 24 JIM 1742 (1985). 
13 See supra note 2. 
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the merits of the environmental dispute. Any number of other international 
environmental issues have similarly eluded resolution and, hence, solution. As in the 
case of state responsibility, compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms, while perhaps 
theoretically appealing, have largely failed to make a difference in the real world. 
Indeed, the reasons for the two phenomena may be related. To the extent the law of 
state responsibility is fuzzy or poorly developed, states may well be reluctant to submit 
to a determination by a third party as to the content of the law in that area. 
Perhaps even more disturbing is the quibbling by United States government officials 
in their articles in International LAw and Pollution over the application of the Trail Smelter14 
rule and Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration15 to the bilateral acid rain dispute 
with Canada. Regardless of the legal merits of that debate, a discerning reader might 
well be left with the persistent, nagging impression - difficult to prove, but nonetheless 
plausible - that international law and even international politics played little if any role 
in the resolution of this decade-long standoff, which the United States regarded as an essen-
tially domestic problem. The recent bilateral agreement on air quality16 offers no more in 
the way of emissions reductions than the previous year's amendments to the Clean Air 
Act17 and was concluded by the United States as an executive agreement because no 
additional statutory authority was necessary for its implementation. Indeed, its timing, 
form, and content tend to support the inference that a sense of international legal obligation 
was largely irrelevant to one of the most serious transboundary pollution problems of 
the century. 
To serve as an effective vehicle for assuring the integrity of the global environment in the 
next century, international environmental law must come to grips with these 
deficiencies. Unfortunately, the gaps and holes are only too easy to identify. The task of 
crafting realistic, workable, real-world mechanisms acceptable to a wide variety of states 
for overcoming existing impediments in the structure of international environmental 
law is far more difficult. Forward-looking opportunities like the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, self-consciously structured to accomplish 
nothing short of "mov[ing] environmental issues into the center of economic policy and 
decision making" 18 but barely mentioned in International LAw and Pollution, are occasions 
for facing these critical challenges squarely. It is interesting to speculate as to how the 
contributors to this book might respond if asked to address, in a subsequent volume, 
criticisms of international environmental law as a tool for averting environmental harm. 
David A. Wirth* 
14 See supra note 9. 
15 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972), principle 21, reprinted in 11 IIM 1416 (1972) ("States have, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.'') 
16 See supra note 2. 
17 See supra note 1. 
18 Strong, "ECO '92: Critical Challenges and Global Solutions," 44 ]IntAJJ 287, 290 (1991) 
(description by Secretary General of United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development). 
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